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A multifaceted problem
The development of Sweden’s security policy might from the 
outside seem as a bit of a mystery. Policy has in the last 25 
years changed dramatically from the Cold War’s neutrality 
policy. The fact that Sweden during the Cold War perceived 
neutrality policy as a necessity is generally acknowledged. 
Sweden saw its role as a buffer between NATO and the War-
saw pact, and in order to achieve national security pursued a 
neutrality policy. After the end of the Cold War the neutrality 
policy was transformed into a policy of military and political 
non-alignment in order to create a possibility of neutrality in 
war. However, contemporary Swedish security and defence 
policy includes military non-alignment in combination with 
political solidarity, and the politicians have stopped talking 
about neutrality.1 
 
From the outside, this means that the necessity of Swedish 
military non-alignment might not be perceived as that clear 
any more. However, the present Swedish government has 
presented a firm no to the suggestion that Sweden should 
apply for NATO-membership. At the same time, the strategic 
changes in Europe have meant that Swedish security and 
defence policy has shifted from the last 10 years’ focus on 
international operations, and the idea to defend Sweden 
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1 Westberg, Jacob (2015) Svenska säkerhetsstrategier. Lund: Studentliter-
atur. Dalsjö, Robert (2015) ”Från neutralitet till solidaritet: omgestaltnin-
gen av Sveriges säkerhetspolitik efter det kalla kriget” in Engelbrekt, Kjell 
& Arita Holmberg & Jan Ångström (ed.) (2015) Svensk säkerhetspolitik i 
Europa och Världen. Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik.
abroad rather than at home, to a policy in which a retreat of 
the armed forces to Swedish territory is a focal point.2 
This situation has created an intricate question of how Swed-
ish military non-alignment, solidarity policy, and the retreat 
of the armed forces to defending Swedish territory can be 
combined, thereby setting the scene for the Swedish NATO-
debate. 
Behind the scenes of the solidarity policy: interna-
tional cooperation
In the 20 years between Sweden becoming a member of the 
EU in 1995 and the last Swedish defence bill in 2015, Swe-
den has gone from a solitary actor in security and defence 
policy towards an actor pursuing a solidarity policy, and is 
currently embedded in a number of international security 
and defence co-operations (EU, Nordic, bilateral, and multi-
lateral, including getting closer to NATO). Behind the solidar-
ity policy there is thus a need for international cooperation. 
The reasons for increased cooperation in security and 
defence have been several; however in the years after the end 
of the Cold War up until the 2000s, they have not primarily 
had the purpose of increasing the capability of defending 
Swedish territory. One reason to start cooperation security 
and defence was the idea that there was no direct threat to 
the Swedish territory, and that Swedish interests therefore 
2 Britz, Malena & Jacob Westberg (2015) “Återtåget till närområdet” Inter-
nasjonal Politikk 03/2015.
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were best defended abroad in international military opera-
tions.3 In order to participate in such operations, interna-
tional cooperation has become necessary, and there has for 
example been an increased interest in cooperation in train-
ing and in equipment acquisition. 
This brings us to a second factor driving increased coop-
eration in security and defence: the increased impact of 
austerity policies on defence policy.4 One rationale behind 
more cooperation has been decreased costs and increased 
efficiency in acquisition processes. This has included efforts 
to buy equipment together, and to push for international 
collaboration in the production of equipment. As was made 
clear by the Norwegian and Swedish supreme commanders 
in 2007 the unwillingness to increase funding of the Armed 
Forces has been seen as an important driver for Nordic coop-
eration.5 Reducing costs has also been an aspect of bilateral 
and multilateral defence cooperation with non-Nordic states. 
The fact that it is not possible to go back to the kind of ter-
ritorial defence Sweden had during the Cold War because it 
would demand too high rises in the defence budget has been 
pointed out in the Swedish Bertelmann report (see below).6
When Swedish security was to be safeguarded through 
participation in international operations, which was stated 
in the parliamentary decision on defence in 2004, interna-
tional cooperation was a given. The decision taken by the 
parliament on defence policy in 2009 confirmed the move 
from a territorial defence to an expeditionary defence. Inter-
national operations were justified referring to the widening 
of the security concept and the more complex threat pic-
ture of transboundary threats, non-state threats, terrorism, 
organised crime, environmental catastrophes and pandem-
ics7 – all of which require international cooperation in secu-
rity and defence. 
The retreat to territorial defence
A paradox here is that the decision on defence policy in 2009 
coincided with a discussion of the need to retreat the Swed-
ish armed forces as a consequence of the Russian military 
actions taken in Georgia in 2008. However, a more extensive 
debate on the future of the Swedish defence did not start 
until 2012 when the Swedish Supreme Commander in an 
interview stated that Sweden only could defend itself for 7 
days (at the most) in the case of an armed attack. The discus-
sion of the Swedish armed forces capacity to defend Swedish 
territory had been non-existent for a long time and therefore 
the statement resulted in surprise on behalf of politicians 
and the general public.8 
The decision on the Swedish defence taken by parliament 
in 2015 has a radically different outlook from the decisions 
from 2004 and onwards. It stated for example that the armed 
forces should be dimensioned in order to work in Sweden 
and its neighbourhood, and that those who have done their 
military service should be given a place in the war time 
organisation of the armed forces. This last example shows 
the dissatisfaction with the education and recruitment of 
soldiers since the universal conscription was abolished. 
The emphasis on a retreat in the Swedish defence policy from 
2015 means that planning for a total defence has become cen-
tral again. The concept of total defence (perhaps most similar 
to the British idea of comprehensive defence) is not new; it 
was the main pillar of Swedish defence policy during the 
cold war. The parliamentary decision from 2015 emphasises 
that total defence includes all activities “needed to prepare 
Sweden for war” both military and civilian.9 The decision 
includes planning for the civilian parts of the defence and 
war placement of civilians. The re-activation of the total 
defence is in stark contrast to the decision on defence policy 
taken by the parliament in 2004. This decision meant that 
the total defence concept was not necessary any more. The 
government therefore decided that the civilian part of the 
total defence would cease to exist.10 An important difference 
between the Swedish conception of the total defence and 
the conception of total defence in Norway and Denmark has 
been that in the Swedish setting it was a wartime concept, 
which meant that none of the activities (civilian or military) 
planned for under this concept could take place in peace-
time.11 The Swedish conception of total defence meant that it 
was difficult for the Swedish bureaucracy to place increased 
EU cooperation in the area of civil protection.12 
According to the official rhetoric of the Swedish govern-
ment the problem of how Swedish military non-alignment, 
political solidarity, and defence of Swedish territory can be 
combined is not really a problem. Sweden does not have to 
apply for NATO membership in order to safeguard its terri-
tory, or to pursue a solidarity policy. However, there is a very 
lively debate in Sweden about NATO-membership, indicating 
that the government does not have full support in this assess-
ment. 
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Differing Swedish positions on NATO-membership
The debate about Swedish NATO-membership was renewed 
first in 2012, then again in 2014 after the confirmed under-
water activities that autumn and in the Bertelmann report.13 
It was intensified in 2015 after the new parliamentary deci-
sion on defence. The current government stated already in 
their declaration of government that Sweden should remain 
military non-aligned and that a Swedish NATO membership 
would not be pursued. This position has been confirmed 
several times, and again as late as in April by the Swedish 
Minister of Defence Peter Hultqvist at a seminar about the 
Swedish host nation support agreement with NATO. In his 
speech Mr Hultqvist emphasised that this agreement should 
not be seen as part of any steps towards NATO membership 
or any general strategy to get closer to NATO, or become 
members through the back door. He stated that the agree-
ment “is what it is” and nothing more.14
The opposition parties, and especially the Conservatives, 
Christian Democrats, and the Center Party have clarified 
their NATO-positive position, claiming that Sweden should 
join the organisation. This is also the case for the Swedish 
liberals, but for them this position is a traditional one. The 
Christian Democrats and the Center Party both changed 
their minds in the autumn of 2015.  When in government, 
the Conservatives during their first term in office only stated 
that NATO-membership was not an issue. During their sec-
ond term in office they initiated a new debate through the 
commission of a report on Swedish defence co-operations, 
the mentioned Bertelmann report, which concluded 
that Sweden should apply for NATO-membership. Some 
representatives in the opposition Alliance (a political 
cooperation between the Conservatives, the Liberals, the 
Christian Democrats and the Center Party) are pushing to 
make NATO-membership a question for the next general 
elections in 2018. This obviously would give new fire to 
the debate on Swedish NATO-membership (and maybe a 
clearer picture of what the general public wants), however, 
many developments are possible before that, both interna-
tionally and domestically. 
What the Swedes think about a Swedish NATO-membership 
is not easily deciphered, but the debate has been fuelled by 
the results from an opinion poll by Gothenburg University 
carried out at the end of 2015 and presented in May 2016.15 
The number of respondents in favour of membership 2015 
was clearly higher than those opposing membership. The 
general trend shown is that over time more people think 
that Sweden should join NATO, but the movement is slow 
and seems to be quite volatile. The number of respondents 
agreeing with the statement “Sweden should apply for 
membership in NATO” has increased from 15% in 1994 to 
38% in 2015. However, the number of undecided to this 
statement was only reduced from 37% to 32% in the same 
time period. At the same time the number of respondents 
claiming that the proposition “Sweden should in peacetime 
be military non-aligned, with the intent to be neutral in 
war” was a good proposition, was 60%. These results are 
contradictory. Despite these contradictions, it seems quite 
clear that when Russia has been perceived to be acting in 
a threatening way, the opinion in favour of Swedish NATO-
membership increases. An indication of this is that when 
an opinion poll by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency 
was carried out (they also carry out opinion polls every 
year) in 2014 just after the alarms of Russian submarines 
in the Swedish archipelago, 48% of the respondents stated 
that Sweden soon, or quite soon, should apply for member-
ship in NATO. When the same questions were asked in 2012 
only 30% were in favour and 47% were against applying for 
membership.16 
NATO-membership has by some debaters been argued to 
be a solution to the question of how to retreat the Swed-
ish armed forces to Swedish territory without going back 
to Cold War style solitary defence policy. The question, as 
it is often posed in the debate, is whether Sweden is more 
or less safe in NATO. One claim that a NATO-membership 
would make Sweden less safe refers to such a membership 
as a threat to Russia’s identity as a great power. Such a (per-
ceived) threat on behalf of Russia would make them more 
aggressive and increase a security dilemma in the Nordic-
Baltic area.17 Other claims that NATO-membership not only 
is needed because of the security guarantees it would bring 
in the form of Article 5, but that it is necessary if Sweden is 
to have the capability to defend itself.18 The debate is very 
lively in 2016.19 It has been fuelled by an interview in the 
Swedish daily newspaper Dagens Nyheter with the Russian 
foreign minister Sergej Lavrov. In the interview he claimed 
that a Swedish NATO membership would mean that the 
Russian armed forces would take measures (which ones 
were not defined). 
 
16  MSB (2015) Opinioner 2014. Allmänhetens syn på samhällsskydd, be-
redskap, säkerhetspolitik och försvar. [https://www.msb.se/RibData/
Filer/pdf/27502.pdf]
17  Hagström, Linus & Lundborg, Tom ”Natomedelmskap gör Sverige 
mindre säkert”, [http://www.dn.se/debatt/natomedlemskap-gor-
sverige-mindre-sakert/]  ; Jonter, Thomas ”Sverige, Nato och frågan om 
säkerhetsgarantier.” [http://manskligsakerhet.se/2015/10/29/sverige-
nato-och-fragan-om-sakerhetsgarantier/]
18  Enström, Karin & Wallmark, Hans. ”Sverige måste göra sig redo för 
medlemskap”. http://www.dn.se/debatt/repliker/sverige-maste-gora-
sig-redo-for-medlemskap/ Tolgfors, Sten & Winnerstig, Mike. ”Nato det 
ansvarsfulla vägvalet för Sverige”. [http://www.svd.se/mest-ansvars-
fullt-att-ga-med-i-nato]
19  A number of op-eds have been written on the topic, both in favour of 
membership and against membership.
13 Bertelman, Tomas (2014) Försvarspolitiskt samarbete – effektivitet, soli-
daritet, suveränitet. Rapport från Utredningen om Sveriges internationel-
la försvarspolitiska samarbete (Fö 2013:b).
14  Hultqvist, Peter. 15 April 2016, Speech at seminar about the Host Nation 
Support Agreement with NATO at the Swedish organisation Society and 
Defence  (Folk och Försvar).
15  Berndtsson, Joakim & Ulf Bjereld & Karl Ydén ”Stöd för Nato-medlem-
skap nu större än motståndet” Op Ed in Dagens Nyheter, 6 May 2016.
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Returning to the political conundrum
The challenge for the present Swedish government is to 
pursue the separation between political solidarity and a 
necessity to become a member of NATO at the same time 
as it changes the main focus of its defence policy and the 
activities of the armed forces from international operations 
to territorial defence. Even though the latest parliamentary 
decision on the Swedish defence policy has reactivated 
the idea of a total defence, it is not possible to go back and 
pursue a more solitary security and defence policy, as was 
done during the Cold War. However, the role of interna-
tional cooperation for a military non-aligned state focusing 
on territorial defence might be less clear than it was when 
focus was on the armed forces participating in international 
operations. As mentioned above, one main driving force 
behind cooperation earlier was economy, but strengthen-
ing of capabilities increasingly seems to play an important 
role.20 The cooperation with Finland is the one pursued the 
furthest, where the Swedish Defence Minister has stated 
that this co-operation is prepared to be carried out in “cir-
cumstances beyond peacetime”.21 It should be pointed out 
here that cooperation “beyond peacetime” only is possible 
with other non-NATO states, which is a fact that acts as an 
inhibitor of a more generally increased Nordic cooperation. 
Another example is the increased transatlantic cooperation 
with the US in the areas of exercises, equipment, research 
interoperability, and international operations.  With regard 
to NATO, Sweden participates in the Enhanced Opportunity 
Program. Increased cooperation is developed with the latest 
step being the Host Nation Support Agreement ratified by the 
Swedish parliament as late as in May 2016. In addition, the 
Swedish armed forces are, despite the ‘retreat’ still engaged 
in international operations, for example the UN mission in 
Mali and in several EU operations. 
It thus seems that one way of balancing between military 
non-alignment, solidarity policy, and a retreat of the armed 
forces to Swedish territory is through increased emphasis on 
bi- and multi-lateral defence cooperation. This is a bit ironic 
given that the solidarity policy grew out of increased interna-
tional cooperation in security and defence. And importantly, 
increasing such cooperation can obviously not be separated 
from political expectations, neither domestically nor interna-
tionally. The NATO-debate will continue.
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